Leaks vs. Leaks

The recent release of thousands of pages of classified material on the Afghan War by WikiLeaks has prompted the inevitable comparison with the Pentagon Papers leaked by Daniel Ellsberg to the New York Times in 1971. While both incidents encompassed the unauthorized release of secret papers to a journalistic source, the comparisons should end there.

Even a cursory examination of the WikiLeaks material shows that it is basically unprocessed data documenting the day-to-day activities of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. These reports are only of value once placed in context by analysts who understand both the intentions of the forces involved and that of the commanders running the show. Civilian readers will likely be somewhat confused by much of the material, and probably bored as well. For example, the narrative of Ref. ID AFG20040101n2 reads:

USSF FINDS CACHE IN VILLAGE OF WALU TANGAY: USSF CONDUCTED A MEET AND GREET IN THE VILLAGE OF WALU TANGAY. USSF MEMBERS WERE APPROACHED BY A LOCAL BOY WHO SPOKE OF A CACHE IN A CAVE ON A NEARBY HILL. USSF MEMBERS INVESTIGATED AND FOUND A CACHE CONSISTING OF THIRTEEN 82MM MORTAR ROUNDS, SIXTY RPG ROUNDS, FIFTEEN BOXES 12.7X108MM AMMO (85 ROUNDS PER BOX), FIVE BOXES NON-DISINTEGRATING 12.7X108MM LINK, AND ONE DSHK BARREL LOCATED IN A CAVE AT 350107.26N 0705513.00E. USSF CONFISCATED THE AMMO. THE REST WAS BLOWN IN PLACE.

Ref. ID AFG20040309n11 is similarly scintillating:

TF 1-501 PIR REPORTS 2X LNS DETAINED DISTRIBUTING ANTI-AMERICAN LITERATURE IVO KHOWST. S- 2X LN DETAINED,A- DISTRIBUTING PROPAGANDA VIA NIGHT LETTERS, L- 42S WB 854895, T- 090539ZMAR04. LOCAL NATIONALS DETAINED BY B/1-501, ALONG WITH KHOWST POLICE, FOR DISTRIBUTING ANTI-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA IN THE FORM OF NIGHT LETTERS STATING ANYONE WORKING WITH THE AMERICANS WILL BE KILLED. LOCAL NATIONALS ARE CURRENTLY BEING QUESTIONED AT FOB SALERNO BY THT. NFI

There are some 91,000 such reports. This is not to say that there is no relevant information to be gleaned from these, but simply to note that they provide only the raw data of an ongoing conflict. Readers who wish to actually understand them need to have enough background in military operations to grasp what is relevant and what is not, and more importantly to be able to identify trends and correlate data with the bigger picture of strategy and operations.

By contrast, the Pentagon Papers was the popular name given to a single report entitled "United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense." This 4,100 page document presented the polar opposite of the WikiLeaks Afghan reports: a cohesive study of a twenty-two year period incorporating analysis with reports from both the military and civilian leadership, providing as comprehensive a picture of the situation between the two countries as had ever existed to that time. Consider a brief excerpt from Volume 4, Chapter 2: Section C of Part I. PHASE II, JULY 1965-MAY 1966:

C. DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCEPT

1. Concept for Vietnam

By late August 1965, the JCS had developed and coordinated a Concept for Vietnam which was set out in JCSM 652-65 dated 27 August. The heart of the concept is summarized as follows:

a. The objective in Vietnam, as stated by NSAM 288, dated 17 March 1964, is a stable and independent noncommunist government.

b. The major problems to be dealt with in the conduct of the war are:

(1) The continued direction and support of Viet Cong operations by the DRV, infiltration from the north, and the apparent attendant Viet Cong capability to provide materiel support and to replace heavy personnel losses.
(2) The continued existence of a major Viet Cong infrastructure, both political and military, in the RVN.
(3) The greater growth rate of Viet Cong strength as compared to that of the South Vietnamese ground forces.
(4) The continued loss of LOCs, food-producing areas, and population to Viet Cong control.
(5) The lack of a viable politico/economic structure in the RVN.
(6) The threat of CHICOM intervention or aggression in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Western Pacific.

c. The basic military tasks, of equal priority, are:

(1) To cause the DRV to cease its direction and support of the Viet Cong insurgency.
(2) To defeat the Viet Cong and to extend GVN control over all of the RVN.
(3) To deter Communist China from direct intervention and to defeat such intervention if it occurs.

d. The US basic strategy for accomplishing the above tasks should be:
to intensify military pressure on the DRV by air and naval power; to destroy significant DRV military targets, including the base of supplies; to interdict supporting LOCs in the DRV; to interdict the infiltration and supply routes into the RVN; to improve the combat effectiveness of the RVNAF; to build and protect bases; to reduce enemy reinforcements; to defeat the Viet Cong, in concert with RVN and third country forces; and to maintain adequate forces in the Western Pacific and elsewhere in readiness to deter and to deal with CHICOM aggression. By aggressive and sustained exploitation of superior military force, the United States/Government of Vietnam would seize and hold the initiative in both the DRV and RVN, keeping the DRV, the Viet Cong, and the PL/VM at a disadvantage, progressively destroying the DRV war-supporting power and defeating the Viet Cong. The physical capability of the DRV to move men and supplies through the Lao Corridor, down the coastline, across the DMZ, and through Cambodia must be reduced to the maximum practical extent by land, naval, and air actions in these areas and against infiltration-connected targets. Finally, included within the basic US military strategy must be a buildup in Thailand to ensure attainment of the proper US-Thai posture to deter CHICOM aggression and to facilitate placing US forces in an advantageous logistic position if such aggression occurs.

Or this from Volume 2, Chapter 1, Section I:

Summary and Analysis

When Kennedy took office, the prospect of an eventual crisis in Vietnam had been widely recognized in the government, although nothing much had yet been done about it. Our Ambassador in Saigon had been sending worried cables for a year, and twice in recent months [in September 1960 and again in December] had ended an appraisal of the situation by cautiously raising the question of whether the U.S. would not sooner or later have to move to replace Diem. Barely a week after taking office, Kennedy received and approved a Counter-Insurgency Plan (CIP) which, at what seems to have been a rather leisurely pace, had been going through drafting and staffing for the previous eight months.

The CIP was a most modest program by the standard we have become accustomed to in Vietnam. It offered Diem financial support for a 20,000 man increase in his army, which then stood at 150,000; plus support for about half of the counter-guerrilla auxiliary force known as the Civil Guard. In return, it asked Diem for a number of reforms which appeared to the American side as merely common sense--such as straightening out command arrangements for the army under which 42 different officials directly responsible to Diem (38 province chiefs, 3 regional commanders, and a Chief of Staff) shared operational command.

The CIP was superseded in May by an enlarged version of the same program, and the only longer term significance the original program held was that it presumably offered the Administration a lesson in dealing with Diem (and perhaps, although it was not foreseen then, a lesson in dealing with Vietnamese governments generally). The negotiations dragged on and on; the U.S. military and eventually most of the civilians both in Saigon and Washington grew impatient for getting on with the war; Diem promised action on some of the American points, and finally even issued some decrees, none of which were really followed up. For practical purposes, the list of "essential reforms" proposed as part of the CIP, including those Diem had given the impression he agreed to, could have been substituted unchanged for the list of reforms the U.S. requested at the end of the year, with equal effect, as the quid pro quo demanded for the much enlarged U.S. aid offer that followed the Taylor Mission.

These are merely small pieces of a thorough analytical examination of American policy in Vietnam, including extensive use of high-level reports written by those responsible for running the war. While it may not be considered a great page-turner by many readers, anyone willing to read it would certainly be able grasp the both overarching principles U.S. leaders employed in dealing with Vietnam and the results of their policies. 

While neither represents a complete picture, it should be understood that not all leaks are created equal. The WikiLeaks material is most notable for the controversial method of its release, while the information contained therein is fairly mundane and offers little insight into the conflict. The Pentagon Papers, by contrast, were most noteworthy for the contents of the report itself, which suggested that what was being publicly reported in America was at odds with what the government knew to be true. In short, then, reports of the sort put forward by WikiLeaks would at best constitute nothing more than an appendix to an analysis of the type leaked by Ellsberg. Anyone who is inclined to read both will quickly discover that their understanding of the war in Vietnam is likely to have been expanded considerably more than that of the Afghan conflict.

The Increasing Allure of Nukes

Nuclear weapons are commonly viewed as the ultimate military capability that a state may possess. Those countries that have developed and constructed nuclear weapons, no matter how limited their numbers or capabilities might be, are set apart from those that have not in the calculations of leaders and foreign policy establishments charged with managing conflict. The possession of even a single functional device is often assumed to mark a quantum shift in that state's global standing and military position. Yet if one looks beneath the surface and examines more carefully the realistic options available of nuclear-armed nations, the limitations are found to be quite significant for those countries with small, newly-developed nuclear arsenals. Indeed, minimal nuclear capability may in some ways serve to impose restrictions on policy options that might not otherwise be present while at the same time creating external pressures that might not otherwise develop. In the interest of understanding the strategic implications of states with limited nuclear capabilities on diplomacy and conflict, we must examine the effect of development on the state's international relations, the conditions in which such weapons might be used, and what exactly can be expected from both their employment as well as mere possession.

Ascendancy to the small circle of nuclear-armed states brings with it considerably baggage. States which have developed their capabilities have done so either outside of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or, if signatories, in direct contravention of it. Neither condition is likely to contribute to widespread support among the global community, at the very least introducing unwelcome complication, and opening the door to possible sanctions or other measures intended to punish the transgression. Naturally, this is likely to be haphazard and contingent upon the specific circumstances of the current balance of power; for example, the United States has made extraordinary efforts to assist India in normalizing their nuclear standing (thus making available to it civilian nuclear technology) in spite of that country's nuclear program operating outside the NPT, with the U.S. intention being to strengthen diplomatic ties in the interest of longer-term security interests. It is of course much easier to overlook the violations of a potential ally half a world away than those of a known enemy or potential short-term rival.

Known nascent programs, such as Iran's, are more likely to be targets of direct action, as the possibility of arresting the development prior to weaponization greatly simplifies the equation (though, with a nod to Clausewitz, one should not mistake simplicity for ease). Israeli strikes against the Iraqi and Syrian programs forestalled development of nuclear weapons in those countries, allowing Israel to maintain regional dominance in the nuclear arena, a cornerstone of her security strategy. In lieu of military action, stiff sanctions and other measures short of war may also be employed. If the state or coalition doing so are militarily dominant in relation to the nuclear aspirant, these efforts may be carried out in relative security (though not without consequence); in the face of a direct challenge, the aspiring nuclear power can be counted on to redouble its efforts in what amounts to a race to see if the sanctions can have a meaningful effect before the development process is completed. Even if it succeeds in building weapons, the costs of doing so under such external pressures will likely be severe. For all of these reasons, states seeking nuclear weapons have strong inducements to keep their programs secret for as long as possible.

The nuclear weapons themselves are only part of the equation; delivery systems must also be available if the state is to have meaningful nuclear capability. Surface-to-surface missiles are the most common method for delivery, as they have traditionally posed the greatest difficulty for defensive systems (though this is changing somewhat) and do not require the extensive air force capabilities necessary to contest air superiority in order to reliably deliver weapons to the target by that method. Submarine-launched missiles offer the most secure method of maintaining a nuclear force for both offensive and deterrent purposes, but this technology is not generally available to new nuclear powers. The range of whatever delivery systems are in use will dictate to a significant degree the extent to which the state will be able to employ (actively or passively) its nuclear weapons; conversely, states outside that range that may oppose the new nuclear state may increase the level of their resistance with relatively limited concern, though regional allies may find themselves more exposed.

Assuming a successful program, the newly-minted nuclear power will now have to determine what it may do with its new capabilities. To have acquired militarily-viable nuclear weapons, that is to say weapons that can be delivered effectively and reliably against relevant targets, is a significant achievement, but it is not the same as having an arsenal capable of offering the full gamut of nuclear strategic options. While a great deal of thought was dedicated to nuclear strategy during the Cold War, and some very useful theories and doctrines generated, little of this is relevant to a state with a handful of low- to medium-yield nuclear weapons, especially if its rivals have larger and more versatile nuclear arsenals.

The Cold War calculus applied to nuclear war incorporated such sophisticated approaches as counter-force and counter-value targeting, secure second-strike capability, and eventually mutually-assured destruction; for a state possessing perhaps a few dozen warheads, many of these options simply do not exist. Counter-force targeting, aimed at an opponent's nuclear weapons, is not likely to be possible, especially if that opponent has dispersed their warheads and has multiple methods of delivery available. Counter-value strikes against cities, intended to raise the cost of fighting to unacceptable levels, are the only realistic option for the small nuclear power, and then only if its delivery systems have sufficient reach. Counter-value targeting works primarily as a deterrent, in effect holding an opponent's population centers hostage as a guarantee against an attack. If, however, this option is exercised, the state will draw the wrath of both its opponent and likely that of a significant portion of the world community. Having expended even one weapon thusly is very likely to provoke retaliation on a scale it cannot hope to match. Lacking both sufficient first-strike capability to inflict catastrophic losses on an opponent and its allies (while casualties and costs would be massive, catastrophic loss must be defined here as sufficient to persistently obstruct the ability of a state to function economically, politically, and militarily), and sufficient survivable second-strike capability to deter massive retaliation for limited nuclear first use, mutually-assured destruction does not apply in this case. In effect, then, any use, and particularly first-use, of nuclear weapons by a small nuclear power against another nuclear power would very likely amount to self-assured destruction.

If first-use against another nuclear power is simple suicide, it must be inferred that the possession of nuclear weapons is viewed as a primarily defensive measure to be held as a final reserve to prevent existential national defeat, or that they are intended to attain dominance over non-nuclear rivals. The logic of the former case is self-evident, if fatalistic: a government facing obliteration in a non-nuclear contest may attempt to forestall the result by escalating the conflict in order to so dramatically increase the cost to its opponent that unconditional surrender or regime change become less attractive than simply ending the conflict, or simply to reap final vengeance on an otherwise-victorious rival. Obviously such an approach is extremely high-risk, but for a state in extremis this risk is no greater than accepting otherwise inevitable defeat. If a state is the first in a region to seek nuclear weapons, doing so will probably trigger a race by regional rivals to develop arsenals of their own in the interest of maintaining the balance of power. This has been seen most notably in the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan, and previously in the early years of the Cold War. If the regional rivals succeed in building viable nuclear arsenals of broadly similar size and capability, the result may in fact be ultimately stabilizing; the possibility of a nuclear exchange has historically had the effect of causing leaders to willingly limit conflict so as to minimize the risk of escalation. The proliferation of weapons to additional states, however, must nonetheless mathematically increase the chance that they will be used.

We must infer then that those states that acquire nuclear weapons perceive a threat significant enough to endanger the existence of the government, and that the threat is compelling enough to offset the diplomatic and economic costs involved with development. Once acquired, nuclear weapons are only of practical value if they can be used to intimidate non-nuclear opponents, or to prevent nuclear-capable rivals from taking action. The possession of roughly equal nuclear arsenals will likely act to reduce the chances of all-out war between rival states, as neither will be willing to risk the costs of either first-use or being the victim of a first-strike, given that both will be restricted to counter-value targeting strategy. The moment of greatest danger for the nuclear aspirant, then, is the period between the decision to develop nuclear weapons and the point at which they become operational, when vulnerability to both nuclear and non-nuclear opponents peaks because they may seek to disrupt the effort before it succeeds. For non-nuclear rivals of a newly nuclear-capable state, the risk persists for as long as the imbalance remains. This of course encourages them to develop nuclear capability of their own, or to at least build stable alliances with nuclear powers. The inevitable conclusion is that, in lieu of a strong and reliable nuclear partner, states facing potential regional nuclear rivals will seek such capability of their own. During the Cold War, the presence of two nuclear superpowers made alliance with one or the other the preferred option for the vast majority of states. In the increasingly divided multipolar global system, however, with power becoming more diffuse and shared more equally among more states, governments are ever more likely to perceive that they must look after their own security, as the threats multiply and alliances become less stable. For all its drawbacks, indigenous nuclear capability provides, if nothing else, reasonable assurance that the regime will not be destroyed from without, and this alone is enough to make it increasingly desirable in a dangerous and uncertain world.

We'd like to help, really we would, but...

Recent candid comments by the Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to the United States first reported by the Washington Times have shown that the problem of a nuclear-armed Iran is very much on the minds of other nations in the region, backpedaling and official "clarifying" statements to the contrary notwithstanding. The ambassador's statement was not formal, which explains its unusual clarity and directness. Simply put, he indicated that a military strike might be necessary in order to halt Iranian nuclear development. In no uncertain terms that he recognized that there would be blowback in the form of economic, social and political pressure, but that all of these short-term issues were less dangerous than the long-term threat posed by a nuclear Iran, calling it the result of a "cost-benefit analysis."

The problem here is not support for a strike from Persian Gulf nations; it is quite likely that, behind closed doors, there are few leaders in the region who would be even remotely troubled by a strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. The calculus is the same: Which is more dangerous in the long-term - a strike against Iran, or a nuclear-armed Iran? No country in the Gulf region wants to see Iran take such an enormous step toward becoming a hegemonic power, and they are likely to accept that there is little that can stop them short of a military strike or sanctions so onerous that they would probably provoke an Iranian military response.

The real difficulty is that there are very few countries capable of conducting such a strike, no matter how necessary it is deemed. The United States and Israel would have the best chances, as each has a modern air force in the region capable of conducting a complex attack under difficult conditions. The Russians might be able to pull it off but have virtually no motivation to do so, and the British, French and Germans have the technology but not the numbers, regional presence or political will. The firestorm created by an Israeli strike would be tremendous, and would very likely cause Israel to face a major increase in terrorist activity from Iran's Hamas and Hezbollah proxies in Gaza and Lebanon respectively. The simple fact is that, should the U.N. Security Council resolve tomorrow to destroy Iran's nuclear program by force, everyone at the table would turn to the U.S. Ambassador.

Thus the U.S. seems once again to be the first, last and only resort. Most of the leaders in the Persian Gulf probably secretly hope the U.S. will simply do the deed and get it over with. This is their ideal set of circumstances: Iran's power is diminished, the regional balance is restored, and the U.S. gets blamed for everything, allowing them the flexibility to manage popular discontent in their own countries. One hopes that American policy-makers are cognizant of how this scenario would play out; their reluctance to act more directly suggests that they are.

Yet American reticence and the inability of virtually every other interested country to carry out their own attack means that the Iranian program is able to continue. Increasingly strict financial sanctions against Iran and companies that deal with it will no doubt complicate Iranian planning, but as long as the world petroleum market provides an outlet for Iranian oil, resources to continue will be available. American efforts to build support in the U.N. are doomed to limited success, as the Russians and particularly the Chinese have too much to gain by staying on Iran's good side; attempts to build a formal regional coalition to oppose Iran seem to be non-existent. Time is on the side of the Iranians, and the longer the crisis builds without strong direct opposition, the greater the chance that Iran will be able to successfully construct a weapon before the U.S. can move to stop it.

That leaves the Israelis, who are truly the wild card in this situation. There is little doubt that Israel regards a nuclear-armed Iran as nothing short of a mortal threat. How far are the Israelis willing to let Iran progress before they determine that they can wait no longer? One suspects that the Mossad is funneling support to the Iranian opposition movement, the Kurds, and any other group that might create trouble for the Iranian government, but suggesting that this alone could forestall the nuclear program smacks of desperation and wishful thinking of the first order. If Israel strikes, it will do so because it is doing the same exact calculations that led to the conclusions mentioned by the U.A.E. ambassador; the only difference being that Israel, unlike every other country in the region, can actually do something about threat posed by Iran.

We're Not Here to be Liked...

As General Petraeus takes command in Afghanistan, it is perhaps worth considering the lessons offered by historical example in trying to envision the end-state of the conflict in that benighted country. The outlook is not encouraging.

The strategy put into place by the outgoing General McChrystal, which will evidently continue under Petraeus, revolves around the idea of conducting a counterinsurgency campaign, which in short entails employing a set of highly restrictive rules of engagement and a minimum of force in order to maximize opportunities for building support for a new local civilian government among the populace; the rather more destructive approach employed during much of the Vietnam War, best summed up in the convoluted logic of the famous statement by a soldier that “(w)e had to burn the village in order to save it,” has not proven to win much backing. This sort of approach is usually applied in a limited area first, and when it has been pacified, efforts are shifted to adjacent areas; this is known as an “inkspot” strategy, as single drops slowly spread across the map, eventually joining to create a singular secure state. Needless to say, building trust among the people, sufficiently weakening the enemy and strengthening the local government, all with limited resort to force, is an expensive and time-consuming process that depends at least as much on perception and belief as it does on material resources.

There is an inherent tension in this sort of conflict for the Great Power involved. How does one address a military escalation by one’s opponent if a commensurate increase in violence will only serve to further isolate the population upon which success ultimately depends? Is the only approach to “kill them with kindness (and development aid)?” If so, how can such a program be carried out if the civil administration is incapable of supporting such an effort? For soldiers trained to fight, as all soldiers must be, this sort of conflict presents one of the most frustrating and difficult challenges of service. For commanders and policy-makers, the problems present a similar (if not greater) conundrum. 

Vietnam is naturally the most common example used in comparison to the current Afghan conflict. American strategy in Vietnam was famously confused, when it was in fact present at all. General Westmoreland’s approach in Vietnam represented what is termed the “ tacticization of strategy,” wherein the tactical objective is erroneously applied to the strategic level; in other words, Westmoreland viewed battlefield defeat of the enemy as an end in itself, but this tactical success led not to victory, but down a strategic cul-de-sac. Westmoreland is only partly to blame, as his civilian superiors gave him precious little strategic guidance, having no idea how to frame the conditions of victory except to identify ending the war as the primary objective.

American leadership largely attempted to ignore the asymmetry of the conflict, assuming or pretending that the Vietnamese people wanted to be free and democratic, that there was no tension between Western ideas and religion (American backed the Catholic Diem regime, to which the majority Buddhist population was generally opposed, if not openly hostile, until Diem’s assassination in 1963) and those native to the region,  and that the Communist opposition could be swayed from its primary purpose by carrots or sticks. Fighting the war on with a strategy based on these premises was a recipe for disaster, as no evidence supported the assumptions that underpinned this approach, while the Vietnamese communists had both a sound strategy and the means to effect it, as well as a far greater commitment to an object that was fundamental to their survival as a state.

Yet the greatest error of America’s war in Vietnam may be that it attempted to build the South Vietnamese state into a self-governing entity even as much of its territory was still contested, if not strongly held by the enemy. Further, the insistence that the South Vietnamese assume the Western form of government, with democratic elections and Enlightenment concepts and ethics lending it legitimacy, only weakened the real power of the South Vietnamese to build a viable nation from a people wholly unfamiliar with these concepts. The desire for rapid success (defined by the American people and government as getting out, presumably without the Communists winning control over all of Vietnam) created tremendous pressure to quickly stabilize the South Vietnamese state; the blind faith in the universal desire for democracy and freedom, combined with the rush to promote self-rule, severely undermined the ability of successive South Vietnamese governments to assume the burden of the war and to build a government that was ultimately sustainable.

In his landmark book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Lt. Col. John Nagl (USA, Ret.) compares the U.S. experience in Vietnam with that of the British in Malaya during the Emergency, 1948-57. Both situations saw Communist insurgencies pitted against Western forces that had to deal not only with the immediate problem but with the broader circumstances of the Cold War as well. After confronting the insurgency for several years without success, the British turned to General Sir Gerald Templar, who was, to paraphrase Field Marshall Montgomery, “the man with the plan.” Templar was instructed that a self-governing unified non-Communist Malaya as the object of British efforts. With this in mind, the British government gave him “exceptional civil and military powers to defeat the insurgency,” appointing him not only High Commissioner (the highest civilian representative of the British government) but also commander of all armed forces in Malaya. Thus Templar was given full control over all assets, civil and military, that could be applied to defeating the insurgency in a singular unified effort prior to establishing a Malayan government, rather than trying to accomplish two difficult tasks at once. He used them to good effect; only when the Communists had been badly weakened did he begin to relinquish control to the nascent Malayan government.

Templar admittedly did not have to face the same bewildering array of political problems that the Americans did in Vietnam - Malaya having been a British colony for some time - but the fundamentals were similar. Securing the civilian population, isolating the insurgents, minimizing casualties and costs, and resolving the conflict expeditiously were all part of Templar’s brief. Without the problem of managing both the war effort and relations with a new and inexperienced local administration with no experience of the government model into which they have been thrust, Templar was free to apply techniques that would have prompted strong local resistance, such as strictly controlling the food supply and limiting movement.

This unified command approach was not pioneered by the British in Malaya, however; indeed, Americans had come to similar conclusions years before, as evidenced in the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual of 1940. This book, the culmination of decades of experience in fighting small wars, was forgotten in the wake of the Second World War, reentered the military’s consciousness as a result of the failure in Vietnam, and has been claimed to be influential in developing post-Cold War policy, yet its lessons have been applied haphazardly and piecemeal. The Small Wars Manual makes quite clear that there must be an effective administration in place while the military objectives are in question: “Military government...is sanctioned because the powers of sovereignty have passed into the hands of the commander of the occupying forces and the local authority is unable to maintain order and protect life and property in the immediate theater of military operations” (emphasis added). The latter state is quite clearly present in Afghanistan today.

The American effort in Afghanistan is badly weakened by the presence of the Afghan government. Corruption, infiltration by supporters of the Taliban insurgents, and general ineffectiveness all undermine popular support, which is critically important to create legitimacy, not least because of the insistence that the government be elected. If the counter-insurgency strategy is to succeed beyond simply allowing the United States to extricate itself from the conflict, the American commander should be invested with overarching civil powers as well as military command. This would clearly be a temporary condition, and may prove unpopular among the Afghan people, but it is necessary if the first precondition of a successful counterinsurgency effort - security of the populace - is to be established. As noted by the Marine authors of the Small Wars Manual seventy years ago, “(i)t should be remembered that the inhabitants do not owe the military government allegiance; but they do owe it obedience.” The American-led coalition of forces in Afghanistan are the only power sufficient to have even a hope of compelling the latter condition, which by our own doctrine is a necessary prerequisite for the former.